Preferences for redistribution : an empirical analysis

People's preferences for state intervention in social policies vary. A cross-section analysis on individual-level survey data is conducted here to highlight the link between the economic position of agents and their specific demand for redistribution. Controlling for a number of factors usually found to affect individual preferences in the literature, the egoistic motives for redistribution are taken seriously and this article focuses on the role played by the occupational status of individuals in shaping their preferences. Thus, the relative importance of economic factors in terms of current and expected gains is estimated, taking into account individuals' experience of social mobility and risk aversion. Furthermore, the research presented here identifies which socio-political groups may be formed on the basis of their preferences for redistribution.Redistribution, occupation, social mobility, ordered logit regression.

Preferences for redistribution : an empirical analysis

URL des Documents de travail : http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/bandeau-haut/documents-de-travail/Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 2011.30 - ISSN : 1955-611XPeople's preferences for state intervention in social policies vary. A cross-section analysis on individual-level survey data is conducted here to highlight the link between the economic position of agents and their specific demand for redistribution. Controlling for a number of factors usually found to affect individual preferences in the literature, the egoistic motives for redistribution are taken seriously and this article focuses on the role played by the occupational status of individuals in shaping their preferences. Thus, the relative importance of economic factors in terms of current and expected gains is estimated, taking into account individuals' experience of social mobility and risk aversion. Furthermore, the research presented here identifies which socio-political groups may be formed on the basis of their preferences for redistribution.Les préférences des individus pour l'intervention de l'Etat dans les politiques sociales varient. Une analyse transversale des données d'enquête au niveau individuel est effectuée ici pour mettre en évidence le lien entre la situation économique des agents et leur demande spécifique en matière de redistribution. Notre échantillon, issu des données ISSP 2006 (module "rôle du gouvernement IV"), se compose de 33 démocraties. Tout en contrôlant par un certain nombre de facteurs généralement considérés par la littérature comme affectant les préférences individuelles, cette recherche prend au sérieux les motifs égoïstes de redistribution. L'article met alors l'accent sur le rôle joué par la situation professionnelle des individus dans l'élaboration de leurs préférences. Ainsi, l'importance relative des facteurs économiques en termes de gains actuels et attendus est estimée, en tenant compte de l'expérience de mobilité sociale des individus et de leur aversion au risque. Enfin, les groupes sociopolitiques pouvant être formés sur la base de préférences communes pour la redistribution sont identifiés

The political economy of neo-liberalism in Italy and France

There are many apparent similarities between the current political and economic situations of France and Italy. The mainstream view is that at least part of the neo-liberal strategy could be a solution to the economic problems of both variants of the European model of capitalism. However, the difficulties met by the implementation of these strategies by Sarkozy and Berlusconi lead to believe that the success or failure of neo-liberalisation has less to do with its (lack of) macroeconomic merits than with the stability of the socio-political alliances that support it. In this respect, France and Italy are markedly different. This paper shows that even if the "hard core" of the neoliberal social bloc is roughly the same in both countries, this core constitutes a minority of the electorate ; a neoliberal strategy must therefore rely on an extended social coalition, which might not be similar between countries. The Great Recession revealed part of the structural characteristics that set both countries apart. The aim of this article is to show that the consideration of the different socio-political alliances found in each country can help to understand how Italy and France ended up on different economic trajectories.Institutions, model of capitalism, neoliberal reforms, political crisis.

How does Party Fractionalization convey Preferences for Redistribution in Parliamentary Democracies ?

In this paper, we highlight the link between the political demand and social policy outcome while taking into account the design of the party system. The political demand is measured by indivudual preferences and the design of the party system is defined as the extent of party fractionalization. This is, to our knowledge, the first attempt in the literature to empirically link the political demand and the policy outcome with the help of a direct measure of preferences. Moreover, we account for an additional channel, so far neglected in the literature : The composition effect of the demand. Indeed, the heterogeneity of the demand within countries, more than the level of the demand itself, is shown to have a positive impact on welfare state generosity. This impact increases with the degree of fractionalization of the party system. We run regressions on a sample of 18 OECD countries over 23 years, carefully dealing with the issues raised by the use of time-series cross-section data.Political demand, party fractionalization, redistribution, time-series-cross-section data.

How does party fractionalization convey preferences for redistribution in parliamentary democracies?

In this paper, we highlight the link between the political demand and social policy outcome while taking into account the design of the party system. The political demand is measured by individual preferences and the design of the party system is defined as the extent of party fractionalization. This is, to our knowledge, the first attempt in the literature to empirically link the political demand and the policy outcome with the help of a direct measure of preferences. Moreover, we account for an additional channel, so far neglected in the literature: The composition effect of the demand. Indeed, the heterogeneity of the demand within countries, more than the level of the demand itself, is shown to have a positive impact on welfare state generosity. This impact increases with the degree of fractionalization of the party system. We run regressions on a sample of 18 OECD countries over 23 years, carefully dealing with the issues raised by the use of time-series cross-section data.political demand ; party fractionalization ; redistribution ; time-series cross-section data

Preferences for employment protection and the insider-outsider divide

IZA Discussion Paper No. 7569 http://ftp.iza.org/dp7569.pdfInsider-outsider theory suggests that in dual labour markets two groups have opposing preferences regarding protection against dismissals: insiders defend employment protection, because it increases their rents. Outsiders see it as a mobility barrier and demand deregulation. Similar divides are expected for unemployment benefits: as insiders and outsiders have diverging unemployment risks, they should demand different levels of protection. Although these views are influential in the political economy debate, there is little empirical research on the effect of contract types on social and labour market policy preferences. We use a novel data set collected in the most recent presidential contest in France, which combines detailed information on respondents' employment status with questions measuring attitudes towards dismissal regulation and other labour market policies. Going beyond insider-outsider theory, we argue and show empirically that the effect of membership in either segment is moderated by the employment situation in workers' occupation

Évolution des attentes sociales et comportement électoral : France, 1978-2002

This paper empirically identifies the multi-dimensionality and the evolution of the political demand of heterogeneous agents. For that purpose, we analyze French post-electoral surveys over the period 1978-2002. The analysis highlights the roots of the French political crisis, which occurred in 2002 while a Far Right candidate reached the second round of the Presidential elections. The key point is the gathering of socio-economic groups around the economic themes that design the political space. Since these themes are evolving over time, social alliances are moving, too. The economic crisis during the 80s and the European integration process of the 90s determine the political demands and multiply the break lines: the two social blocks that used to support the Republican Right and the governmental Left progressively break up.Cet article met en lumière de manière empirique la multi-dimensionalité et l'évolution de la demande politique d'agents hétérogènes. Dans ce but, on mène une analyse de données sur des sondages post-électoraux français de 1978 à 2002. L'analyse met en évidence les origines de la crise politique française de 2002, avec la présence au second tour du candidat d'extrême droite à l'élection présidentielle. L'élément clé est la cristallisation de groupes sociaux autour des thèmes économiques qui structurent l'espace politique. D'une part, les principales dimensions de la demande évoluent au cours du temps, d'autre part les alliances sociales se modifient autour de ces demandes. La crise économique dans la décennie 1980 et le processus d'intégration européenne au cours de la décennie 1990 conditionnent les demandes politiques et multiplient les lignes de fracture : les alliances sociales de soutien à la droite républicaine et à la gauche de gouvernement éclatent progressivement

Les quatre leviers de la redistribution

Les systèmes de taxes et transferts permettent de réduire les inégalités de revenus à travers quatre leviers : taux d'imposition, progressivité de l'impôt, taux de transferts sociaux et degré de ciblage des transferts. Nous étudions les différentes configurations combinant ces quatre leviers dans 22 pays de l'OCDE. La progressivité de l'impôt est mesurée par un indice de Kakwani qui évalue la surconcentration de la fiscalité sur les revenus élevés; le ciblage des transferts est mesuré par un indice symétrique; la réduction des inégalités de revenu est mesurée par la variation des indices de Gini avant et après redistribution. Nous utilisons les micro-données du Luxembourg Income Study sur le revenu des ménages, que nous complétons par l'imputation de données fiscales non observées (en particulier les cotisations employeur). L'étude porte sur 67 observations entre 1999 et 2013. Nous montrons que la plupart des pays utilisent davantage les prélèvements obligatoires que les prestations en espèces (hors pensions de retraite) afin de redistribuer les revenus. Par ailleurs, l'effet plus ou moins redistributif des transferts sociaux dépend davantage de leur niveau moyen que d'une différence dans leur degré de ciblage. En revanche, c'est à la fois le taux de prélèvements et la progressivité qui expliquent l'effet redistributif du système fiscal. Enfin, nous observons une incompatibilité entre forte progressivité et haut niveau de prélèvements obligatoires

Evolution des attentes sociales et comportement électoral : France, 1978-2002

Cet article met en lumière de manière empirique la multi-dimensionalité et l'évolution de la demande politique d'agents hétérogènes. Dans ce but, on mène une analyse de données sur des sondages post-électoraux français de 1978 à 2002. L'analyse met en évidence les origines de la crise politique française de 2002, avec la présence au second tour du candidat d'extrême droite à l'élection présidentielle. L'élément clé est la cristallisation de groupes sociaux autour des thèmes économiques qui structurent l'espace politique. D'une part, les principales dimensions de la demande évoluent au cours du temps, d'autre part les alliances sociales se modifient autour de ces demandes. La crise économique dans la décennie 1980 et le processus d'intégration européenne au cours de la décennie 1990 conditionnent les demandes politiques et multiplient les lignes de fracture : les alliances sociales de soutien à la droite républicaine et à la gauche de gouvernement éclatent progressivement.intervention de l'Etat ; intégration européenne ; demande politique ; comportement de vote ; élections ; crise politique ; France

How does party fractionalization convey preferences for redistribution in parliamentary democracies?

In this paper, we highlight the link between the political demand and social policy outcome while taking into account the design of the party system. The political demand is measured by individual preferences and the design of the party system is defined as the extent of party fractionalization. This is, to our knowledge, the first attempt in the literature to empirically link the political demand and the policy outcome with the help of a direct measure of preferences. Moreover, we account for an additional channel, so far neglected in the literature: The composition effect of the demand. Indeed, the heterogeneity of the demand within countries, more than the level of the demand itself, is shown to have a positive impact on welfare state generosity. This impact increases with the degree of fractionalization of the party system. We run regressions on a sample of 18 OECD countries over 23 years, carefully dealing with the issues raised by the use of time-series cross-section data